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Abstract
We explored group and organizational safety norms as antecedents to meeting leader behaviors
and achievement of desired outcomes in a special after-action review case—a post-fall huddle. A
longitudinal survey design was used to investigate the relationship between organizational/group
safety norms, huddle leader behavior, and huddle meeting effectiveness. The sample included
healthcare workers in critical access hospitals (N = 206) who completed a baseline safety norm
assessment and an assessment of post-fall huddle experiences ree to six months later. Findings
indicate that organizational and group safety norms relate to perceived huddle meeting
effectiveness through appropriate huddle leader behavior in a partial mediated framework. In
contrast to previous research showing after-action reviews predicting group and organizational
safety norms, the longitudinal study presented here suggests that group and organizational safety
norms set the stage for the enactment of post-fall huddles in an effective manner.

Keywords: Post-Fall Huddles, After Action Reviews, Safety Norms, Leadership
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Group and Organizational Safety Norms Set the Stage for Good Post-Fall Huddles
Efforts to improve organizational safety and quality are of upmost concern. Industrial
accidents cause nearly 427,000 non-fatal employee illnesses and 5,300 worker fatalities in the
United States each year, with an estimated total economic impact of $198.2 billion (National
Safety Council, 2014). Organizational safety concerns also affect consumers. In healthcare
settings, nearly one in 10 patients experience a healthcare acquired condition (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2014), and as many as 440,000 patient deaths may be
attributed to preventable medical errors every year (James, 2013). Preventable medical errors
cost upwards of $19.5 billion, and estimates of the economic impact of poor healthcare quality
and medical errors may exceed $98 billion (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012).
Thus, organizational leaders - especially in healthcare organizations - seek ways to reduce costs
associated with accidents of all types and improve safety and well-being of employees and
clients/patients (Chassin & Loeb, 2011; Zohar, 2000). One way to improve safety in
organizations is the development and maintenance of a safety climate and group norms for safe
behavior (Dunn, Scott, Allen, & Bonilla, 2016; Zohar, 2000).
Organizations with a strong climate for safety often have fewer accidents and injuries
(Zohar, 2000) and lower incidences of patient safety events (Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, &
Baker, 2009). Safety climate is a type of group and organizational climate in which employees
believe that management rewards, supports, and expects safe behavior and safe work practices
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, 1998). Thus, when organizations and groups have strong, positive
safety climates, employees tend to engage in more safety behaviors and also avoid engaging in
risky behaviors (Zohar, 2000). These changes in behavior result in reduced costs associated with
accidents or deaths from poor behavior in risky environments. Therefore, one goal of
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practitioners and researchers is to determine those organizational and group processes that
increase the frequency of safe behaviors; one such process is the use of after-action reviews
(Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013).
Interventions like after-action reviews (AARs) may be implemented within an
organization to facilitate sensemaking and learning to prevent future errors, and such activities
foster a culture and climate of safety (Allen, Baran, & Scott, 2010). AARs are a specific type of
workgroup meeting in which people discuss, interpret, and attempt to make sense of a recent
event during which they collaborated (Scott, Allen, Bonilla, Baran, & Murphy, 2013). AARs are
also referred to as post-incident critiques, post mortems, hot washes, huddles, or debriefs. AARs
are a common process in organizations that operate in high risk contexts because they help to
maintain reliability and resiliency by facilitating learning in groups/teams from past events and
changing perceptions and shared understanding of risky behaviors (Busby, 1999).
Much of the past research on the relationship between leadership and organizational and
team culture and climate focuses on the role of the leader in shaping the climate. The purpose of
this study was to take a different approach to previous models of establishing a good safety
climate and group safety norms (e.g. how a given intervention promotes safety norms; Baran,
Allen, & Scott, 2010) (see Figure 1). Specifically, our research here considered how established
group and organizational safety norms within an organization related to individual leader
behaviors in AARs and the outcomes of AARs used to learn from events (see Figure 2). Using
Schein’s (2010) model of culture and leadership, we assert that safety norms will promote leader
engagement in effective AAR leader behaviors resulting in more effective AARs. Schein argues
that leaders both promote organizational culture and are also shaped by the existing culture.
Specifically, lower level leaders (such as those that tend to lead AARs) are selected to reflect and
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represent the current organizational and group culture. When an organization or group focuses on
safety culture, leader effectiveness will be determined in part by the leader’s alignment of their
behavior with the safety culture (Schein, 2010). We further suggest that group safety norms will
facilitate leader behaviors that enable learning from the AAR. That is, leader behaviors that focus
on learning from errors or near errors, avoiding blame, showing respect and encouraging
different points of view will then facilitate effective communication, information exchange and
learning in AARs and improve learning. These in turn will result in increased satisfaction and
perceptions of effectiveness by participants in the AAR.
------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here
------------------------------------------Group and Organizational Safety Norms and Leadership
Norms represent the shared way in which individuals understand and behave within a
particular setting (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), and reflect the culture of the organization (Schein,
2010). In the context of safety, safety norms reflect individuals’ understanding of safety and how
to behave safely within their group and organization, respectively (Allen et al., 2010). Norms,
such as safety norms, are learned and develop through interactions and communication with
others, help individuals identify safety concerns, and guide decisions about how one responds to
the situation (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Furthermore, senior management and leadership may set
expectations that guide the development of organizational safety norms through the introduction
of organizational policies and procedures needed to attain organizational strategies and goals
related to safety (Zohar, 2000). Similarly, supervisors and managers institute practices necessary
to implement and execute organizational policies and procedures relevant to safety at various
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subunits of the organization, which may guide the development of group safety norms (Zohar,
2000).
Organizations seek to promote group and organizational safety climate and norms as they
relate to actual safety outcomes (e.g., accidents) among employees in organizations (Clarke,
2006). What is less known is whether safety norms relate to process-oriented behaviors that
enact and regulate such norms within the organizations such as leader behavior and AARs. That
is, what processes regulate the behaviors of employees such that accidents are less likely beyond
the feeling and desire to maintain alliance with the organizational and group norms? As norms
reflect the culture of the group and the organization, we expect that safety norms would have an
effect on leader behavior. That is, group and organizational norms can determine how leaders
attend to information and how leaders behave. Further, leaders then transmit organizational and
group culture through a variety of mechanisms (Schein, 2010). Schein (2010) identifies six
primary ways in which leaders transmit the organizational culture. These six mechanisms include
(1) what leaders pay attention to; (2) how leaders react to crisis and critical incidents; (3) how
leaders allocate resources; (4) role modeling and teaching; (5) allocation of rewards; and (6) how
leaders recruit and select. In addition, Shivers-Blackwell (2006) found that perceptions of
organizational culture influence how leaders perceive their own role and behaviors within the
organization. AARs can be considered as a situation in which a critical incident is being
discussed, and the leader of the AAR acts as a role model for how to learn from errors, allowing
leaders to engage in two of these mechanisms. Further, leader behavior within the AAR is likely
influenced by leader perception of organizational safety climate.
AARs, Safety, and the Post-Fall Huddle
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An AAR is a post-event meeting intended to facilitate conversation about an incident or
near incident to identify what happened and why, help team members analyze how their actions
contributed to the outcome, and identify necessary changes (Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006).
Previous work shows that AARs were related to safety climate and the development of safety
norms depending upon the quality of the AARs (Dunn et al., 2016) as well as the extent to which
they occur on a regular basis (Allen et al., 2010). Much of this research looks at typical military
or paramilitary organizations such as firefighter crews, however, the usefulness of AARs may be
broader than these studies suggest.
Conducting AARs is particularly important in healthcare settings, where a focus on
learning and planning to prevent similar future events or near misses is a beneficial response to a
particular adverse event (Nicolini, Waring, & Megnis, 2011). A post-fall huddle is a special case
of AAR that occurs immediately after a patient fall, and a best practice in a comprehensive fall
risk reduction program (Boushon et al., 2012; Degelau et al., 2012). Post-fall huddles may
include a variety of healthcare professionals (e.g., nurses, physical therapists, pharmacists) in
addition to family members and the patient. Recent research indicates healthcare professionals
may readily adopt post-fall huddles to learn from and prevent future patient falls, and that the use
of post-fall huddles over time may reduce certain types of errors that contribute to these patient
safety events (Reiter-Palmon, Kennel, Allen, Jones, & Skinner, 2015).
Group and Organizational Safety Norms and Post-Fall Huddle Effectiveness
More frequent use of AARs to discuss and learn from events improves perceptions of
group safety norms (Allen et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2016). However, strong group and
organizational safety norms may also provide an environment and context that supports the
enactment of AARs and huddles in an effective way. That is, instead of AARs promoting safety
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norms, we argue that if an organization has good group and organizational safety norms, then
AARs are enacted more effectively. Specifically, safety norms may encourage individuals to
engage in actions and activities that ultimately promote safety. One mechanism by which safety
norms can encourage more effective participation is through leader behaviors in these AARs.
Specifically, organizational culture and its related norms, in this case, safety norms, will provide
the leader with guidelines as to what behavior is considered appropriate in the context of the
AAR (Schein, 2010; Shivers-Blackwell, 2006), such as how to react to critical incidents and role
model appropriate behavior in such situations. As such, strong safety norms would indicate not
only that AARs are necessary, but also what specific leader behaviors are conducive in
facilitating learning (Schein, 2010). Post-fall huddles are uniquely situated to test this idea, as the
individuals who convene to participate in a huddle may vary depending upon time of day, shift,
location of the fall, and availability of individuals from various health care disciplines beyond
nursing (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). Due to the variation in personnel that attend post-fall
huddles, we expected that organizational and group safety norms will exert even a stronger
influence on leader behavior in post-fall huddles.
Specifically, we believe that positive organizational and group safety norms enable
leaders to more effectively enact the post-fall huddle and thereby improve the effectiveness of
these small group meetings. Meeting effectiveness is the extent to which a meeting
accomplishes the goals for which it was called (Rogelberg, Leach, Warr, & Burnfield, 2006).
Sometimes these goals can be objectively measured, for example, in the case where the meeting
includes an identifiable task and outcome. However, both anecdotal experience and research
indicate that meetings are often poorly run and do not accomplish the goal for which they are
called, if such a goal even existed (Allen, Lehmann-Willenbrock, & Rogelberg, 2015). As such,
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more recently, meeting effectiveness is indexed by asking participants how effective they feel the
meeting was based on overall experience (Cohen, Rogelberg, Allen, and Luong, 2011). This
more global approach has been used in a variety of studies connecting meeting effectiveness and
satisfaction to a variety of workplace attitudes and outcomes (e.g. Rogelberg, Allen, Shanock,
Scott, & Shuffler, 2010; Lehmann-Willenbrock, Allen, & Belyeu, 2016).
In regard to post-fall huddles, effective after-action reviews focus on sensemaking,
learning from errors, and the development of a plan to address safety concerns to prevent another
patient fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). If group and organizational norms prioritize and
emphasize safety, participation in activities such as post-fall huddles may become a standard
practice and naturally be supported by these cultural norms. Operating with an understanding
that safety is critical to the attainment of group and organizational goals, individuals participating
in post-fall huddles may engage in effective discussion and reflection, knowing that learning
from and preventing future patient falls are desired safety outcomes for the group and the
organization. Thus, we expected that group and organizational safety norms will positively relate
to post-fall huddle effectiveness.
Hypothesis 1: Group safety norms and organizational safety norms are positively related
to post-fall huddle effectiveness.
Meeting Leader Behaviors and Post-Fall Huddle Effectiveness
As indicated earlier, a post-fall huddle is a specific form of an AAR meeting. More recent
research on meetings has explored the role and function of a facilitator or leader to promote
effective meetings (Malouff, Calic, McGrory, Murrell, & Schutte, 2012; Ravn, 2013). Ravn
(2013) proposed that meeting leaders can engage in activities such as setting direction and focus,
monitoring conversation, and encouraging participation, in an effort to enhance the meaning and
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value derived from the meeting. Credo, Armenakis, Feild and Young (2010) found that when
employees perceive positive relationships with their supervisor, safety norms and safety
knowledge were higher. Similarly, Borgersen, Hystad, Larsson, and Eid (2014) found a moderate
relationship between leadership behaviors and safety climate in the shipping industry. Keinmann,
Nussbaumer, Rosenbaum, Olien, and Rogelberg (2016) found that meeting satisfaction was
greater when leaders were viewed as engaging in more considerate behaviors such as
encouraging participation, listening, facilitating exchange of information, and ensuing learning
from past events. Therefore, we suggest that a constellation of leader behaviors focusing on
support of employees, engaging in open and safe discussion of errors and near misses in a
positive way, and emphasizing learning will lead to more effective AARs.
These leader behaviors are particularly important to post-fall huddle effectiveness, as
there is rarely a set or consistent facilitator who leads any given post-fall huddle given variations
in the time of day, shift, and location of the fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). Leaders may create
conditions that support effective and constructive huddles by exhibiting and visibly modeling
appropriate and desired behaviors, such as open reflection, sharing information, and respectful
interaction (Provost, Lanham, Leykum, Mc Daniel Jr., & Pugh, 2015). Thus, we expected that
effective post-fall huddle leader behaviors will improve the effectiveness of these huddles.
Hypothesis 2: Huddle leader behaviors in post-fall huddles are positively related to
overall huddle effectiveness.
Mediated Model of Safety Norms, Huddle Leader Behaviors, and Effective Huddles
Given the importance of meeting leader behaviors on effectiveness and outcomes of
meetings, organizational and group norms may improve huddle effectiveness through its effects
on huddle leader behaviors. Although cultural expectations and norms within groups and
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organizations may be supported by managers and leaders, culture and norms may also indicate to
and constrain leadership actions that are expected within the group and organization (Alvesson,
2011; Shivers-Blackwell, 2006). As indicated by Schein (2010), leader behavior often reflects
organizational culture and norms. Leader behaviors are not only a mechanism that transmits
culture and norms, leader behaviors are also shaped by the organizational culture and reflect it.
When group and organizational standards indicate safety is necessary to attain group and
organizational goals, post-fall huddle leaders are likely to be motivated to encourage open
discussion and reflection and role model behaviors necessary to learn from and prevent future
patient falls, therefore facilitating the transmission of these important norms. Post fall huddles
are a particularly effective approach as these take place after an error or adverse event (a fall).
This allows the post fall huddle leader to reinforce safety norms by engaging employees in a
discussion around how the event could have been prevented and how future events can be
prevented. Thus, consistent with previous work on culture and its transmission, we expected
group and organizational safety norms will create an environment that condones huddle leader
behaviors that focus on learning and modeling of support and respect, and that such behaviors
would in turn improve huddle effectiveness (see Figure 2).
Hypothesis 3a: Huddle leader behaviors mediate the positive relationship between group
safety norms and huddle effectiveness.
Hypothesis 3b: Huddle leader behaviors mediate the positive relationship between
organizational safety norms and huddle effectiveness.
Method
Sample and procedure
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Hospital staff from 15 small rural critical access hospitals (CAHs) in a Midwestern state
participated in a two-year project funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) to decrease fall risk. CAHs are a special category of hospital created in 1997 by the
U.S. government to maintain access to care in rural areas by providing cost based reimbursement
for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. CAHs are licensed for 25 or fewer beds, have an
annual average length of stay less than 4 days, and are at least 35 miles from the next hospital
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013). CAHs may benefit from interventions
to improve fall risk reduction practices because they have higher inpatient fall rates than larger
hospitals (Jones et al., 2015), lack external financial regulatory incentives to reduce falls (Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services), and have limited resources to implement quality
improvement activities (Flex Monitoring Team, 2004).
In February and March 2014, 2,550 hospital staff who provided direct patient care, those
whose work directly affected patient care, providers, and those who identified as administration
and management were invited to complete an online survey about the hospital’s safety culture.
Approximately 1,701 staff members among the 15 hospitals completed this survey, with an
average hospital response rate of 67% (range 40-81%).
Approximately three to six months later (i.e., June through August 2014), 1,550 hospital
staff who provided direct patient care, provided services in patient rooms, were members of the
hospital fall risk reduction team, or were part of management were invited to complete a survey
about their experiences with post-fall huddles. Consistent with evidence-based practice, hospitals
in the fall risk reduction project were expected to implement post-fall huddles after each patient
fall, regardless of whether harm occurred (Degelau et al., 2012). These staff were instructed that
the purpose of the huddles was three-fold: (1) to identify the factors that contributed to that
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specific patient fall (i.e. the root causes), (2) to identify interventions to reduce the risk of a
future fall, and (3) to apply what is learned in a huddle to other patients, thus improving the
reliability of the system. Participants were asked to complete the post-fall huddle questions if
they had participated in at least one post-fall huddle during the two year falls project.
Approximately 245 staff members (15.8%) among those surveyed in the 15 hospitals indicated
they had participated in at least one post-fall huddle (M = 3.83, SD = 3.03) and completed the
survey. Falls are typically an infrequent adverse event (Mahoney, 1998), thus, there were a
relatively small number of patient falls reported among the project hospitals (N = 328, M = 22
per hospital, range 6-50). Approximately 65% of falls were followed by a huddle (n = 213, M =
14 per hospital, range 4-33), and personnel who may participate in a post-fall huddle vary based
on time of day and patient.
Each participant was assigned a unique identifier that was linked to their name and
hospital to match survey respondents across the two surveys that occurred three to six months
apart. In total, 206 staff members among the 15 hospitals completed both the safety culture and
post-fall huddle surveys. Most respondents were middle-aged (M = 44.20, SD = 12.61),
Caucasian (90.8%), and female (85.4%). Nearly two-thirds (63.6%) were registered nurses,
licensed practical nurses, nurse practitioners, or certified nursing assistants; the remainder were
physical and occupational therapy and assistants (9.7%); management (8.3%); pharmacy and
assistants (2.4%); quality improvement, risk management, and patient safety (2.4%); physician
assistants (0.5%); and other ancillary hospital staff (12.6%).
Measures
Organizational and group safety norms. Participants completed two domains of the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
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Culture (HSOPS): management support for patient safety (i.e., organizational safety norms; three
items; sample item, “Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient
safety”), and supervisor and manager actions promoting patient safety (i.e., group safety norms;
four items; sample item, “My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for
improving patient safety”). Although norms are considered a shared belief, we focus on
individual level perceptions of the norms which is consistent with previous work on safety norms
in organizations (Allen et al., 2010). Items in these two domains are the items used in Zohar and
Luria’s (2005) organization safety climate measure, and Zohar’s (2000) group safety climate
measure. Participants responded to each survey item on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Huddle leader behaviors. Approximately 178 (73%) respondents indicated their huddle
had a formal or informal leader and were asked to complete eight items from the huddle leader
behaviors survey (Dunn et al., 2016) to evaluate their perceptions of post-fall huddle leader
behaviors from their most recent huddle (sample item, “During the huddle, the leader allowed
everyone involved in the huddle a chance to speak”). Participants responded to each survey item
on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Huddle effectiveness. Post-fall huddle survey participants indicated the effectiveness of
their most recent huddle with three items from the huddle effectiveness survey (Cohen,
Rogelberg, Allen, & Luong, 2011). Participants indicated the extent to which their most recent
huddle was efficient, productive, and effective, on a 1-5 Likert-type scale (1 = To no extent, 5 =
To a great extent).
Demographic control variables. A variety of potential demographic control variables
were assessed including age, gender, and race; none demonstrated a significant correlation with
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the study variables. Consistent with current conventions concerning the use of control variables
(Becker, 2005), we did not include them in the subsequent analyses.
Results
Table 1 displays variable means, standard deviations, correlations, and Cronbach alpha
reliabilities. All measures demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. Correlations among all variables
were significant and consistent with the direction of the hypotheses.
------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------Hypothesis Tests
Multiple regression was used to test Hypothesis 1, which indicated group safety norms
and organizational safety norms would be positively related to post-fall huddle effectiveness
rated approximately three months later. Consistent with this hypothesis, group safety norms (β =
.27, p < .001), and organizational safety norms (β = .24, p = .002), were both significantly and
positively related to post-fall huddle effectiveness and explained a significant amount of variance
(R2 = .21). Hypothesis 2 stated huddle leader behaviors in post-fall huddles would be positively
related to overall huddle effectiveness. Consistent with this hypothesis, huddle leader behaviors
(β = .60, p < .001) were significantly and positively related to huddle effectiveness.
We followed Hayes’ (2009) recommendations to test the mediation hypotheses, and
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping methods to evaluate the indirect effects of group and
organizational safety norms (independent variables) on huddle effectiveness (outcome) through
huddle leader behaviors (mediator). Hypothesis 3a indicated huddle leader behaviors would
mediate the positive relationship between group safety norms and huddle effectiveness (see
Table 2). Results indicate a partial mediation, such that the positive effect of group safety norms
on huddle effectiveness is partially mediated by huddle leader behaviors. Hypothesis 3b stated
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huddle leader behaviors would mediate the positive relationship between organizational safety
norms and huddle effectiveness (see Table 3). Results also indicate a partial mediation, such that
the positive effect of organizational safety norms on huddle effectiveness is partially mediated by
huddle leader behaviors. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples, we computed indirect effect estimates
and 95% confidence intervals for these estimates. Table 4 displays the results of the
bootstrapping analyses. The indirect effects of both organizational safety norms and group safety
norms on huddle effectiveness by huddle leader behaviors were significant.
-------------------------------------------Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here
-------------------------------------------Discussion
The impact of organizational and group safety norms on AAR effectiveness was partially
mediated by huddle leader behaviors. This suggests that individuals in organizations with
environments supporting strong group and organization safety norms may be primed to initiate
safety improvement processes, such as AARs, and do so effectively. That is, positive safety
norms may set the stage for subsequent behaviors that are rewarded, supported, and expected by
the organizational or group safety climate (Hobfoll, 1989; Zohar, 2000). Those that lack such
norms may require more extensive actions, incentives, and effort to reframe individuals’ attitudes
and understanding around the benefits of safety for themselves and others in order to improve
effectiveness of safety actions and learning experiences. Specifically, one reason why safety
initiatives may not immediately work is because the prevailing safety climate/culture does not
support the behavior and therefore, more robust efforts may be needed to reframe attitudes
towards safety generally.
Theoretical Implications
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Several theoretical implications follow from the current study. First, this study suggests a
possible feedback loop in the relationship between AARs and group safety norms. Previous
research indicates AARs may improve norms (Allen et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2016), and our
results further suggest that safety norms may improve perceptions of AARs. That is, more
frequent and effective use of AARs can improve individuals’ perceptions of safety norms, which
may, in turn, improve their use and perceptions of AAR effectiveness. Furthermore, this study
supports the importance of leader behaviors in conducting effective meetings (Malouff et al.,
2012; Ravn, 2013; Seibold & Krikorian, 1997) such as AARs. Our research indicates that strong
group and organizational safety norms may be an important antecedent to effective AAR
leadership, and that engagement in effective leadership behaviors in AARs may explain part of
the effect of safety norms on perceptions of effective AAR meetings such as post-fall huddles.
This finding is particularly important as effective post-fall huddles facilitate sensemaking,
learning from errors, and the development of a plan to address safety concerns to prevent another
patient fall (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015).
Second, this study confirms that AARs may be a useful tool in a variety of contexts. The
majority of research on AARs or debriefs has occurred in military, paramilitary, and other high
risk occupations (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). The nature of risks in healthcare domains is
not the same as military contexts, yet the complexity of the situations, the consequences of
mistakes, and the need for high levels of expertise make healthcare an appropriate context to
deploy a learning tool such as AARs, particularly at an identifiable problem such as patient falls
(Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015).
Third, demonstrating that effective AAR leader behaviors increase as the positive safety
norms increase has implications for leadership research and theory. Specifically, this study adds
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more to the ongoing discussion of how organizational culture, and specifically norms, shape
leader behaviors and facilitate what behaviors are viewed as effective (Schein, 2010). Based on
this study, the desired behaviors in AARs emerge as a function of a work environment that
promotes such behavior, thereby supporting leadership emergence through their behavior. Future
research should investigate individual differences in those who do and do not respond favorably
to the positive safety norm environment identified here. This study adds to the limited empirical
testing of this notion.
Practical Implications
The importance of leader behaviors in conducting effective meetings (Malouff et al.,
2012; Ravn, 2013; Seibold & Krikorian, 1997) is well-established. Efforts to develop and train
leaders to demonstrate specific behaviors related to leading effective meetings, including AARs,
are certainly necessary. Knowing that post-fall huddle leaders respond favorably to strong
positive safety norms suggests another mechanism to encourage effective leader behavior in
AARs is to improve organizational and group safety climate. Thus, a practical application of
these results suggest organizational leaders and managers should identify ways to improve the
safety climate/norms of their organizations at both the organizational and the group levels. Such
efforts may start with senior leadership and group level management to establish and enforce
expectations, policies, and procedures (Zohar, 2000) prior to initiating safety protocol
interventions. Evaluation of safety climate and tracking changes in safety climate over time may
be fruitful.
Targeted efforts to improve safety climate/culture may also provide opportunities for
promoting a variety of safety behaviors, including AARs (i.e. huddles). In this case, these efforts
are particularly important given the retrospective nature of post-fall huddles. These types of
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AARs occur post-event (e.g., after a patient fall) to facilitate sensemaking, learning from errors,
and the development of plans and commitment to actions to prevent a similar event from
occurring in the future (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2015). If safety climate/culture can encourage
effective leader actions in such meetings, organizations confronted with safety concerns may
embrace the benefits of a climate of safety on proactive actions to prevent safety events from
occurring at all. By extension, if leaders respond favorably to one type of organizational
environmental factor, it stands to reason that other climate factors may have similar effects on
leader behavior and employee enactment of such norms (Schein, 2010).
Limitations
The limitations of this study must be taken into account when considering the study
results and their respective implications and generalizations to theory and practice. The small
sample size of hospitals and large variation in survey response (specific to post-fall huddles and
matched responses with the safety assessment) within hospitals limited our ability to control for
hospital effects and nesting of data. As indicated in the method section, inpatient falls are
typically an infrequent adverse event (Mahoney, 1998), explaining the large variation in number
of falls, the subsequent number of post-fall huddles across hospitals, and the number of
respondents who completed all of the study assessments. However, the pattern of results were
consistent across hospitals, independent of hospital size.
All study variables were measured with perceptual, self-report surveys, suggesting a
susceptibility to method variance and common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003). We took steps to attempt to minimize the impact of method bias in our results,
following recommendations established in the literature (Conway & Lance, 2010; Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). In particular, given the limited frequency and relative
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unpredictability of inpatient falls, and respect for patient and staff privacy in the process of care,
the feasibility of using other methods, such as direct or videotaped observation, to evaluate the
study variables in question was limited. Further, the study participants worked within the
organizational and group safety norms, were exposed to the effects of the huddle leader
behaviors, and formed perceptions of the effectiveness of the huddle. Thus, consistent with the
intentions of our research questions, we used perceptual survey measures to evaluate individuals’
perceptions of group and organizational climate, huddle leader behaviors, and huddle
effectiveness. The study design and methodology evaluated safety norms independent of, and
just prior to, the evaluation of huddle effectiveness and leader behaviors, creating a temporal
separation in measurement of the key predictors and criterion. Finally, the survey used in the
evaluation of safety norms is a widely used measure of hospital safety culture with strong
psychometric properties (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016).
Finally, the unique nature of our sample (small, rural critical access hospitals) may bound
the generalizability of our findings as it is unclear whether such “small scale” initiatives can have
an equally meaningful impact on a large system hospital. Replications and extensions of this
work are necessary to further support the stability and generalizability of the study findings.
Future research can explore these effects in larger systems, and within other high-reliability
industries seeking approaches to improve effectiveness of AARs and other structured reflection
and learning opportunities.
Future Directions
The forgoing study turned the typical model of promoting safety in organizations on its
head, to some extent. Instead of simply trying to promote safety norms through a variety of
means, this study argued that having a positive safety climate/norms made the enactment of a
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subsequent safety initiative more effective. The opportunities for future research, given the
findings here, are quite exciting. For example, a variety of other safety initiatives such as
rewards, incentives, adoption of safety equipment, and so forth may be more effective when
employees already buy into safety generally.
Further, future research could identify at what level of safety climate/norms are specific
safety initiatives more likely to be effective and enacted by employees. For instance, do safety
norms at the group or organizational level, or at both levels, enhance the effectiveness of safety
equipment use and incentives or rewards for engaging in safe behaviors. It is likely that some
initiatives, perhaps more passive in nature, could be enacted in low safety norm settings, thereby
enhancing perceptions of safety norms making more active initiatives possible. Further,
additional research may evaluate the mechanisms by which group and organizational safety
norms improve leadership and team interactions in more interactive types of safety initiatives,
such as AARs.
Finally, additional research may also link these relationships to objective safety outcomes
specific to the industry of interest. Such outcomes may reflect adverse event occurrences—in the
case of this study, an objective outcome would be the number or rate of falls. However, objective
safety outcomes may also emphasize near misses or ‘good catches’ in which an action that had
the potential to cause harm or damage was caught and avoided.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables
1. Group safety norms
2. Organizational safety norms

M
4.03
4.00

SD
.69
.68

1
(.80)
.57**

3. Huddle leader behavior

4.07

.60

.36**

2

3

4

5

6

-.05

--

(.70)
.36**

(.96)

4. Huddle effectiveness
3.78
.79
.41**
.40**
.60** (.94)
--5. Gender
.08
.10
-.05
.04
6. Age
42.91
12.58
.05
.13
.04
.01
Note. N = 206. Cronbach alpha reliabilities reported on the diagonal in parentheses.
**p < .01.
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Table 2
Multiple regression analysis to test group safety norms mediation
Model
1
2

Variable
Intercept
Group safety norms

b
1.88
.47

SE
.35
.09

t
5.30**
5.44**

Intercept
Group safety norms
Huddle leader behavior

-.22
.26
.68

.40
.08
.09

-.05
3.29**
7.46**

Note. N = 206.
**p < .01.

β

F
R2
29.56** .17

ΔF

ΔR2

.41
48.10** .40
.23
.51

55.59** .23
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Table 3
Multiple regression analysis to test organizational safety norms mediation
Model Variable
1

2

β

b

SE

t

1.94

.36

5.42**

Organizational safety norms

.46

.09

5.22**

Intercept

.03

.40

.07

Organizational safety norms

.24

.08

3.01**

.21

Huddle leader behavior

.68

.09

7.52**

.52

Intercept

Note. N = 206.
**p < .01.

F

R2

ΔF

ΔR2

27.23**

.14

47.01**

.38 56.48** .24

.40
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Table 4
Mediation of the effects of group safety norms and organizational safety norms on huddle
effectiveness through huddle leader behaviors
Bootstrapping
Product of
Coefficients

Percentile
95% CI

BC 95% CI

BCa 95% CI

β

SE

Z

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

GSN - HLB - HE

.24**

.069

3.92

.112

.385

.122

.397

.120

.394

OSN - HLB - HE

.23**

.107

3.94

.058

.450

.048

.429

.019

.391

Note. N = 206. GSN = group safety norms; OSN = organizational safety norms; HLB = huddle
leader behaviors; HE = huddle effectiveness; CI = confidence interval; BC = bias corrected; BCa =
bias corrected and accelerated; 5,000 bootstrap samples.
** p < .01.
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Figure 1: Traditional Safety Intervention to Safety Climate Model
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Figure 2: Mediated Model of Safety Norms on Huddle Effectiveness through Leader Behaviors
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